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Abstract. Network formation games have been proposed as a tool to explain
the topological characteristics of existing networks. They assume that each
node is an autonomous decision-maker, ignoring that in many cases different
nodes are under the control of the same authority (e.g. an Autonomous Sys-
tem) and then they operate as a team. In this paper we introduce the concept
of network formation games for teams of nodes and show how very different
network structures can arise also for some simple games studied in the liter-
ature. Beside extending the usual definition of pairwise stable networks to
this new setting, we define a more general concept of stability toward devia-
tions from a specific set C of teams’ coalitions (C-stability). We study then a
trembling-hand dynamics, where at each time a coalition of teams can create
or sever links in order to reduce its cost, but it can also take wrong decisions
with some small probability. We show that this stochastic dynamics selects
C-stable networks or networks from closed cycles in the long run as the error
probability vanishes.
1. Introduction. Network formation games are nowadays a consolidated branch
of game theory [7, 8, 15, 16]. They study which networks’ structures arise when
the nodes are selfish rational players, who can sever or create some links in order
to increase the utility they perceive from the network. In particular, it is usually
assumed that each node can unilaterally sever a link to one of its neighbors, while
the creation of a new link requires the approval of both the participating nodes. This
idea has lead to the concept of pairwise-stable networks [19], i.e., networks for which
every existent link is beneficial to both the connected nodes and every inexistent link
is not beneficial to at least one of the two nodes it would connect. Different dynamics
for links’ creation/destruction have been studied. Specific network formation games
have been proposed to explain the topological characteristics of existing networks,
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91A25; 91A43; 91A06; ; Secondary
93E15; 60J10.
Key words and phrases. Network Formation Games, Teams, C-stability, Strong stability, Sto-
chastic stability.
∗The authors are listed in alphabetical order
1
2 AVRACHENKOV, NEGLIA AND SINGH
including the Autonomous Systems’ (ASs’) network taking for example into account
both costs for routing traffic and for a lack of end-to-end connectivity [1, 5, 20]. They
have also been used to investigate the distributed formation of overlay topologies
on top of the Internet [9], or routing topologies among relay stations in future
cellular networks [28], or among nodes in multi-hop wireless networks to prevent
eavesdropping [29].
Network formation games consider that each node is an autonomous decision-
maker, ignoring that in many cases different nodes are under the control of the same
authority (e.g. the routers in an AS) and then they constitute a team. We observe
that introducing teams in a simple variant of a network formation game proposed in
[6] leads to different stable network structures. This motivates us to study network
formation games with teams and define new stability notions for this new class of
games. Although the concept of teams is not new to game theory, e.g., there is a
recent work by Boncinelli and Pin [4] where they analyze team formation process
in game theoretic models. To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to
introduce teams in network formation games and aims to open a new and, in our
opinion, interesting research direction.
Our first contribution is then to define network formation games for teams of
nodes and define team-pairwise stability analogously to pairwise stability in stan-
dard network formation games. The second contribution of our paper is to provide
a more general concept of stability toward the deviations from a specific set C of
teams’ coalitions (we talk then about C-stability). This idea can capture the fact
that some groups of teams are more likely to cooperate than others. For example,
ASs located in far away regions may have no incentive to connect directly. In addi-
tion to the above notions of static stability, we also consider the dynamic formation
of networks also in the presence of random errors (trembling-hand dynamics). We
then discuss the dynamic stability notion called stochastic stability, i.e., which net-
works are selected by the dynamics as the error probability vanishes. So, as a final
contribution, we prove that under this trembling-hand dynamics only C-stable net-
works or networks from closed cycles are selected with non-zero probability in the
long term when trembling vanishes. The case where there is no restriction on the
coalition formation among teams, the C-stability is called strong stability. We show
that our trembling-hand dynamics selects all strongly stable networks and networks
from closed cycles as the error probability vanishes.
Now, we describe some existing works related to our stochastic stability result.
Jackson and Watts [18] are the first ones to consider trembling-hand dynamics
in standard network formation games for the case of pairwise interaction between
nodes. At each time during pairwise interaction considered in [18], a pair of nodes
are selected and only a link between them is altered. The mutations are present in
the dynamics due to a wrong decision taken by the selected pair of nodes at each
time. They showed that a stochastically stable network is a pairwise stable network
or a network from a closed cycle. Jackson and Watts [18] also considered the case
where a pair of nodes can add a new link between them and at the same time each
node of selected pair can sever existing links with other nodes of network. They
applied these models into matching problems such as marriage problem and college
admission problem [14, 27]. For some recent stochastic stability results on matching
problems see [22, 26]. We generalize the results from [18] in both static and dynamic
settings. We first introduce teams in network formation games and define team-
pairwise stability analogous to pairwise stability. We allow teams to form all possible
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coalitions and define the notion of C-stability. In dynamic formation of networks, we
assume that at each time a teams’ coalition is formed. The coalition makes a move
from the current network to a new network, by adding or severing some links in the
current network, if at new network all the teams in the coalition are at least as well
off and at least one team is strictly better off. At each time the coalition makes a
mistake with small probability and as a result the obtained network need not be
beneficial for all the teams in the coalition. We show that a stochastically stable
network is a C-stable network or a network belonging to a closed cycle of networks.
We also show that if a network of a closed cycle is stochastically stable, all the
networks of the closed cycle are stochastically stable. The stochastic dynamics based
on the coalitional deviations in general finite games, using different dynamics rules,
have been considered before [23, 30] . Sawa [30] studied the stochastic stability
in general finite games where the mutations are present through a logit choice
rule. Newton [23] considers the situation where profitable coalitional deviations
are given greater importance than unprofitable single player deviations. In general,
the stochastic stability results depend on the way actions being chosen during the
infinite play. Some other famous works on stochastic stability in different settings
include [4, 11, 12, 13, 21, 24, 25, 31].
The paper is organized as follows. We start providing the basic definitions for
network formation games with teams in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 we provide a
simple variant of a network formation game proposed in [6] showing that different
network structures arise in the presence of teams. We move then to introduce the
general concept of C-stability in Section 4. Section 5 describes the trembling-hand
dynamics. We show some numerical results for specific games in Section 6. Finally,
we conclude our paper in Section 7.
2. Network formation games with teams: Basic definitions. In this section
we define network formation games for teams and we start extending some usual
concepts in network formation games’ literature to our setting. In particular, we
define the notion of team-pairwise stability to characterize meaningful equilibria.
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a finite set of nodes. Let P = {T1, T2, · · · , Tm}, m ≤ n
be a partition of N . The undirected edges can be formed both between the nodes
belonging to a same set Ti (called internal links) as well as belonging to the different
sets Ti and Tj (called external links). The edge between the nodes k and l is denoted
by kl. We say that there is a link between Ti and Tj if there is at least one link kl
with k ∈ Ti and l ∈ Tj . The collection of edges defines a network g.
In standard network formation games, each node k has its own cost ck(g). In
network formation games with teams we consider that the nodes belonging to each
set Ti share the same cost c(Ti, g), which depends in general on the structure of
the whole network g. As a consequence, they will form or sever links only if this is
beneficial for the whole set Ti, i.e., if the cost of Ti is reduced. For this reason we
refer to each Ti, i = 1, 2 . . . ,m, as a team. In particular, the nodes in a team will
agree to create an internal link kh with k, h ∈ Ti, if c(Ti, g∪kh) < c(Ti, g), and will
agree to sever an internal link kh if c(Ti, g \ kh) < c(Ti, g). This leads to following
definition of internal stability:
Definition 2.1 (Internal stability). A network g is internally stable in team Ti if
no further links can be created or severed within the nodes from Ti, i.e., if g
′ is a
network which is obtained from g via the addition of new links within the nodes of
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Ti or destruction of existing links within the nodes of Ti, then c(Ti, g
′) > c(Ti, g).
A network is internally stable if it is internally stable in all the teams.
The destruction of an external link is unilateral: any of the two nodes can sever
the link if this is beneficial for its team. On the contrary, the creation of an external
link requires the agreement of both the teams involved. The link will then be created
only if it does not increase the cost of any of the two teams and it decreases the
cost of at least one of them. These link formation rules lead to the following notion
of equilibrium for network formation games with teams:
Definition 2.2 (Team-pairwise stability). A network g is said to be team-pairwise
stable if
(i) g is internally stable, and
(ii) for all the pairs (Ti, Tj) if kl ∈ g such that k ∈ Ti, l ∈ Tj then
c(Ti, g) ≤ c(Ti, g \ kl) and c(Tj , g) ≤ c(Tj , g \ kl), and
(iii) for all the pairs (Ti, Tj) if kl /∈ g, such that k ∈ Ti, l ∈ Tj and if
c(Ti, g ∪ kl) < c(Ti, g) then c(Tj, g ∪ kl) > c(Tj , g).
3. Network formation games with teams: A motivating example. Fab-
rikant et al. [10] introduced a network formation game where each node can add
as well as sever the links unilaterally. Corbo and Parkes [6] considered the case
when link destruction is unilateral but link creation requires the agreement of both
the nodes involved. The two games are called in [6], respectively the Unilateral
Connection Game and the Bilateral Connection Game (BCG). We focus on BCG
because we are interested in pairwise interaction among the teams. We introduce a
simple variant of BCG, that we call the Heterogeneous Bilateral Connection Game
(HBCG) and study it in the presence or absence of teams. We observe that, even in
a very simple case, a stable network structure in the presence of teams is not stable
when each node is an independent rational player. This shows the usefulness of the
new stability notions defined in the Section 2 and it motivates us to study network
formation games with teams. Note that while in this section we consider a specific
cost function from [6], our definitions and results in the the rest of the paper hold
for general cost functions.
3.1. The bilateral connection game [6]. Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a finite set
of players (nodes). The cost of a link is 2α which is equally shared between both
the corresponding nodes. Let kg(i) denote the degree of node i in network g which
is the total number of links connected to i. A node also incurs the cost due to
the distance from all other nodes. The distance between the nodes i and j in the
network g is defined as the minimal number of hops along a path connecting them
and it is denoted by dg(i, j). If there is no path connecting node i and node j, the
distance dg(i, j) = ∞ . The cost incurred by node i in network g is
ci(g) = α · kg(i) +
∑
j∈N ;j 6=i
dg(i, j). (1)
3.2. The heterogeneous bilateral connection game. We introduce a variant
of BCG that we call the Heterogeneous Bilateral Connection Game (HBCG). In
HBCG nodes are divided into the disjoint sets {Ti}
m
i=1. The cost of a link between
two nodes from the same set is 2α
β
, β > 0, and the cost of a link between two nodes
from the different sets Ti and Tj is
4α
β
. If all the nodes are independent rational
players, the cost of a link formation is equally shared between the corresponding
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nodes, i.e., a node incurs cost α
β
by forming a link with a node from a same set and
it incurs cost 2α
β
by forming a link with a node from a different set. In this case,
the total cost incurred by a node i belonging to set T in a given network g is given
by
ci(g) =
α
β
· kg(i|T ) +
2α
β
· kg(i|T
c) +
∑
j∈N ;j 6=i
dg(i, j),
where kg(i|T ) denotes the number of neighbors of i inside set T and kg(i|T
c) is the
number of i’s neighbors outside the set T . We observe that if each set Ti includes
only one node and β = 2, HBCG reduces to BCG. In what follows we consider that
each set Ti has cardinality at least 2.
If the nodes belonging to each set Ti, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, form a team, the cost
experienced by each member is shared by the whole team. In this case, each team
incurs cost 2α
β
for forming an internal as well as an external link.
For a given network g, the cost of a team Ti is then defined as
c(Ti, g) =
∑
k∈Ti
ck(g) =
2α
β
(
E(Ti) +
∑
Tj∈P
j 6=i
E(TiTj)
)
+
∑
k∈Ti
∑
j∈N
j 6=k
dg(k, j), (2)
where E(Ti) is the total number of internal links of Ti and E(TiTj) is the total
number of external links between Ti and Tj. Finally the cost of a network g is
denoted by c(g) and it is defined as the sum of the costs of all teams.
We now study the effect of teams on the stability of network topologies. We
show that even for a simple case β2 < α ≤ β a team-pairwise stable network is not
a pairwise stable network.
Proposition 1. Consider HBCG with teams and β2 < α ≤ β. In a network g if
all the nodes from each team form a complete network internally, the network g is
internally stable.
Proof. Let g be a network where all the nodes from each team form a complete
network internally. It is not possible to decrease the cost of a team by deleting
internal links because deleting one internal link will increase the cost of each team
by at least 2 due to distance, while the cost reduction due to deletion of link is only
2α
β
≤ 2. Hence, g is internally stable.
Similarly to the star network in standard network formation games, we define a
star network at team level which we call a team-star. A network is a team-star if
i) each team has at least two nodes, ii) all the nodes of each team form a complete
network internally, iii) there is a central team with a node called central node such
that all the nodes of other teams are connected to the central node and iv) there is
no other external link. An example of a team-star is in Figure 1
Proposition 2. For β2 < α ≤ β, a team-star network is team-pairwise stable in
HBCG with teams but it is not pairwise stable in HBCG without teams.
Proof. Let g be a team-star network, then by definition g is internally stable. From
the definition of g it is clear that the distance between any two nodes of g is at most
2. A new link between any two non-central teams cannot be created because it costs
each team 2α
β
> 1 while the distance reduction for a team is only 1. Similarly, a
new link between the central team and a non-central team cannot be created. Also,
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no existing link between the central team and a non-central team can be deleted
because deleting one such link will cost at least 2 to each team (because there are at
least two nodes in the team whose distance to some other node increases by at least
one), while the cost due to the destruction of the link is reduced only by 2α
β
≤ 2.
So, a team-star is team-pairwise stable.
Assume that there is no team, i.e., the nodes belonging to each set Ti, i =
1, 2, · · · ,m, are independent rational players. Then a team-star network is not
pairwise stable because the central node k from the central set Ti will form at most
one link to each set Tj , j 6= i.
Proposition 3. For α > β, a star network is a team-pairwise stable in HBCG with
teams as well as pairwise stable in HBCG without teams.
Proof. Let g be a star network. In the presence of teams, no internal links can be
formed in g because forming an internal link will cost 2α
β
> 2 to a team while the
distance reduction for a team is only 2. An external link in g between two teams
cannot be formed because it will cost each team 2α
β
> 2 while the distance reduction
for a team is only 1. No existing links of g can be deleted because in that case the
cost of each team due to distance would be ∞. Hence, g is a team-pairwise stable.
In the absence of teams, a new link in g between two nodes from the same set
cannot be formed because it will cost each node α
β
> 1, while the distance reduction
for a node is only 1. A new link in g between two nodes from different sets cannot
be formed because it will cost each node 2α
β
> 2, while the distance reduction for a
node is only 1. No existing links of g can be deleted due to the same reason given
for the case of teams.
Now there is an interesting question: for β2 < α ≤ β which network is pairwise
stable when nodes belonging to sets {Ti}
m
i=1 do not form a team. To get an idea how
a pairwise stable network looks like, we consider an instance of HBCG with 9 nodes
that are divided into 3 sets, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and T1 = {1, 2, 3}, T2 =
{4, 5, 6}, T3 = {7, 8, 9}. The team-star network given in Figure 1 is team-pairwise
stable but not pairwise stable from Proposition 2. A pairwise stable network in this
case when nodes from T1, T2 and T3 do not form a team is given in Figure 2.
1
4
5 6
7
2
9
3
8
Figure 1. Team-
star: A team-
pairwise stable
network
1
9
5
3
8
6
2
74
Figure 2. Pairwise
stable network
The cost of the team-star network from Figure 1 is c(team-star) = 42α
β
+ 114
and the cost of the network g from Figure 2 is c(g) = 54α
β
+ 108. For α > β2 ,
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c(team-star) < c(g). In the simple case of HBCG, introducing the teams give us
a team-pairwise stable network which is not pairwise stable but is less costly than
the pairwise stable network.
4. Stability of networks against teams’ coalitions. In this section, we intro-
duce the concept of stability against the teams’ coalitions. This notion of stability
generalizes team-pairwise stability in two directions. First, the creation of a link
between two teams requires the agreement of the whole coalition the two teams be-
long to (if any). Second, a coalition can create/severe simultaneously multiple links
among its members (while team-pairwise stability considers only the possibility to
either add or remove a single link at a time). In order to formally define this new
stability concept we introduce the following definitions analogous to those in [17] for
standard network formation games. Let C ⊂ 2P denote the set of teams’ coalitions.
Definition 4.1. A network g′ is obtainable from g via deviation by a coalition
S ∈ C as denoted by g →S g
′, if
(i) if kl ∈ g′, kl /∈ g, k ∈ Ti and l ∈ Tj , then {Ti, Tj} ⊂ S.
(ii) if kl ∈ g, kl /∈ g′, k ∈ Ti and l ∈ Tj then {Ti, Tj} ∩ S 6= φ.
The condition (i) requires that new links can be added only between teams that
are part of the coalition S. The condition (ii) requires that at least one team
of any deleted link has to be part of S. The case Ti = Tj corresponds to the
creation/destruction of internal links from a team of the coalition. We denote
G(S, g) as a set of all networks which are obtainable from g via a deviation by S.
Definition 4.2. A deviation by a coalition S from a network g to a network g′ is
said to be improving if
(i) g →S g
′,
(ii) c(T, g′) ≤ c(T, g), ∀ T ∈ S (with at least one strict inequality).
Let GI(S, g) be the set of all networks g
′ which are obtainable from g by an im-
proving deviation of S, i.e.,
GI(S, g) =
{
g′ ∈ G(S, g)|c(T, g′) ≤ c(T, g), ∀ T ∈ S,
c(T ′, g′) < c(T ′, g) for some T ′ ∈ S
}
.
Let GnI(S) = G(S, g) \GI(S, g) be the set of networks g
′ which are obtainable
from g but do not lead to an improvement (they would be chosen by “error”). It
is clear that g ∈ GnI(S, g). It is reasonable to consider that a coalition would only
accept improving deviations. This leads to the following definition of stability.
Definition 4.3. A network g is C-stable if it is not possible for any coalition S ∈ C
to make an improving deviation from g to some other network g′.
A C-stable network may not always exist, but in that case there exists some set
of networks lies on a closed cycle and all the networks in a closed cycle can be
reached from each other via an improving path. We next give the definitions of an
improving path and closed cycle.
Definition 4.4 (Improving Path). An improving path from g to g′ is a sequence
of networks and coalitions g1, S1, g2, · · · , gn−1, Sn−1, gn such that g1 = g, gn = g
′
and gk+1 ∈ GI(Sk, gk) for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1.
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Definition 4.5 (Cycles). A set of networks Q form a cycle if for any g, g′ ∈ Q there
exists an improving path connecting g and g′. A cycle Q is said to be a closed cycle
when no network in Q lies on an improving path leading to a network that is not
in Q.
Theorem 4.6. There exists at least a C-stable network or a closed cycle of networks.
Proof. The proof follows similar lines to the proof for pairwise stable network given
in [18]. Here we sketch the proof for completeness. A network is C-stable if and only
if it does not lie on an improving path leading to some other network. So, start at
any arbitrary network g. If there exists no improving path from g then g is C-stable
otherwise g lies on an improving path leading to some other network. In the first
case result is established. We consider the second case. Follow the improving path.
Since, there are finite number of networks, then either the improving path ends at
some network which has no improving paths and in that case the resulting network
must be C-stable or it will form a cycle. That is, there exists either a C-stable
network or a cycle. Consider the case where there are no C-stable networks. Given
the finite number of networks and non-existence of C-stable networks there must
exist a closed cycle.
5. Dynamic formation of networks under coalitions. In this section we con-
sider a scenario where networks are formed dynamically over time and coalitions
may or may not make errors. We first consider the case when the coalitions of
teams do not make errors over time. At each time t = 1, 2, · · · , a coalition St ∈ C
is randomly selected with probability pSt > 0. If possible, the coalition selects an
improving deviation gt+1 ∈ GI(St, gt) with probability pI(gt+1|St, gt). If there is no
improving deviation then the coalition does not modify the network, i.e. gt+1 = gt.
The above situation can be modeled as a Markov chain over the set of possible
networks, whose transition law P 0 is defined as:
P 0(g′|g) =
∑
S∈C;GI(S,g) 6=φ
pS pI(g
′|S, g)1GI(S,g)(g
′) +
∑
S∈C;GI(S,g)=φ
pS1{g′=g}(g
′),
(3)
for all g, g′, where pI(·|S, g) is a probability distribution over GI(S, g), and 1B(·)
is an indicator function on a given set B. It is clear that the C-stable networks
and the closed cycles of networks are recurrent classes of P 0. A C-stable network
corresponds to an absorbing state of P 0 and a closed cycle corresponds to a recurrent
class of P 0 containing more than one state (i.e. more than one network).
We now introduce the possibility that coalitions make errors, i.e., they may not
select at a given step an improving coalition and then they can make worse off
one of their members. This may take into account the incertitude about the ac-
tual costs of a network topology or a bounded rationality. In particular we adapt
the usual trembling-hand model [18]. At each step the coalition chooses a non-
improving deviation with probability εf(St, gt) ∈ (0, 1), where f(St, gt) takes into
account the fact that some coalitions can be more prone to make errors than others
and that some network configurations may lead to wrong choices more often than
others. The parameter ε allows us to tune the frequency of errors. So, at time t+1
the coalition St selects an improving deviation with probability
(
1 − εf(St, gt)
)
.
In particular it chooses gt+1 ∈ GI(St, gt) according to the distribution pI(·) de-
fined above. By combining the probabilities we obtain that the coalition selects
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gt+1 ∈ GI(St, gt) with probability
(
1 − εf(St, gt)
)
pI(gt+1|St, gt). The coalition
selects a non-improving deviation with probability εf(St, gt). Let pnI(·|S, g) be a
distribution overGnI(S, g), the coalition chooses gt+1 ∈ GnI(St, gt) with probability
εf(St, gt)pnI(gt+1|St, gt). If there is no improving deviation, then with probability
(
1 − εf(St, gt)
)
the coalition does not modify the network, i.e., gt+1 = gt, and
with the complementary probability selects a network in GnI(St, gt) according to
the distribution pnI(·|St, gt). These rules define a perturbed Markov chain whose
transition law P ε is:
P ε(g′|g) =
∑
S∈C
GI(S,g) 6=φ
pS
[
(1− f(S, g)ε)pI(g
′|S, g)1GI(S,g)(g
′)
+ f(S, g)εpnI(g
′|S, g)1GnI(S,g)(g
′)
]
+
∑
S∈C;GI(S,g)=φ
pS
[
(1 − f(S, g)ε)1{g′=g}(g
′)
+ f(S, g)εpnI(g
′|S, g)1GnI(S,g)(g
′)
]
(4)
for all g, g′. It is easy to check that if ε = 0, P ε reduces to P 0 defined above.
The perturbed Markov chain P ε is irreducible because given nonzero errors it
is possible to reach all the networks starting from any network in a finite number
of steps. It is also aperiodic because with positive probability the state does not
change. Hence, there exists a unique stationary distribution µε of the perturbed
Markov chain. However, when ε = 0, there can be several stationary distributions
corresponding to different C-stable networks or closed cycles. Such Markov chains
are called singularly perturbed Markov chains [2], [3]. The probability of making
error can be sufficiently small. So, we are interested in the networks to which the
stationary distribution µε assigns positive probability as ε → 0. This leads to the
definition of stochastic stability:
Definition 5.1. A network g is stochastically stable relatively to the process P ε if
limε→0 µ
ε
g > 0.
We recall a few definitions from Young [31]. If P ε(g′|g) > 0, g 6= g′, the one
step resistance r(g, g′) from network g to g′ is defined as the minimum number of
errors that are required for the Markov chain to make a transition from g to g′
in one step. In our case it is clear that r(g, g′) ∈ {0, 1} for any pair (g, g′). One
can view the networks as the nodes of a directed graph that has no self loops.
The weight of a directed edge is represented by the one step resistance between
the corresponding networks and the resistance of a directed path (/tree) is the
sum of the weights of its edges. We can then define the resistance from g to g′ as
the resistance of the minimum-resistance path from g to g′ (there exists at least
one because P ε is irreducible). We now introduce a stochastic potential of recurrent
classes of P 0 (remember these are important because they are the C-stable networks
or the closed cycles of networks). It can be computed by restricting to a reduced
graph G where the total number of nodes are the number of recurrent classes of P 0
(one representative gi ∈ Gi for each recurrent class Gi). Given two nodes gi, gj of
G, the weight of the directed edge from gi to gj is the resistance from gi to gj . Given
a node gi ∈ G, consider all the directed spanning trees such that from every node
gj ∈ G, gj 6= gi, there is a unique path directed from gj to gi. Such spanning trees
are called gi-trees. The stochastic potential of gi (and then of Gi) is the resistance
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of the gi-tree having minimum resistance among all the gi-trees. The resistance
between any two networks in the same recurrent class is null, because no error is
required to move from one to the other. It follows that the stochastic potential of
any network gi ∈ Gi is the same and then the definition of the stochastic potential
of the class Gi does not depend on the specific choice of its representative. We have
now provided the background required to state and prove the following result.
Theorem 5.2. All C-stable networks and the networks belonging to closed cycles,
that have minimum stochastic potential, are stochastically stable networks . Further-
more, if one network in a closed cycle is stochastically stable then all the networks
in that closed cycle are stochastically stable.
Proof. We know that the Markov chain P ε is aperiodic and irreducible. From (3)
and (4) it is easy to see that
lim
ε→0
P ε(g′|g) = P 0(g′|g), ∀ g, g′.
From (4) it is clear that, if P ε(g′|g) > 0 for some ε ∈ (0, ε0], we have
0 < ε−r(g,g
′)P ε(g′|g) < ∞.
Therefore, the Markov chain P ε is a regular perturbed process because it satisfies
all the three conditions given in [31]. Hence, it follows from Theorem 4 of Young [31]
that as ε → 0, µε converges to a stationary distribution µ0 of P 0 and a network g
is stochastically stable if and only if g is contained in a recurrent class of P 0 having
minimum stochastic potential. Therefore, all C-stable networks and the networks
belonging to closed cycles having minimum stochastic potential are stochastically
stable. The proof of last part follows from the fact that the stochastic potential of
each network in a closed cycle is the same.
Remark 1. The stochastic stability results do not depend on the function f(·) or
the distributions of pI(·), pnI(·) and p = (pS)S∈C .
5.1. Strong stability: We consider the case where there is no restriction on the
formation of teams’ coalitions, i.e., C = 2P . In this case C-stability is called strong
stability.
Corollary 1. If there is no restriction on the formation of teams’ coalitions, all
the strongly stable networks and the networks belonging to every closed cycle are
stochastically stable.
Proof. Now, it is always possible to reach one network from another network by
at most one error due to the formation of grand coalition. Then, the resistance
between any two distinct recurrent classes Gi and Gj is always 1. Hence, the
stochastic potential of each recurrent class of P 0 is J-1, where J is the number of
recurrent classes of P 0. In fact, a spanning tree in graph G includes only J−1 links
and each of them has resistance 1. The proof then follows from Theorem 5.2.
6. Simulation results. In the previous section we have characterized which net-
works are selected in the long run by the trembling-hand dynamics, when the error
probability ε converges to 0. Studying the dynamics itself for a finite ε is a harder
problem, so we resort to simulations to investigate i) which networks appear more
frequently during the dynamics and ii) which quasi-stable networks arise and how
fast. By a quasi-stable network we mean a network that appears for a long period
of time before a random error makes it disappear. We cannot be sure that such
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networks are indeed stable with respect to the set of coalitions we consider in the
specific experiment (in general only a direct inspection of all the possible deviations
could reach such conclusion). Nevertheless, specially for the larger values of ε the
quasi-stable networks can appear over time durations comparable with those of the
stable networks, so that practically speaking, they are as important as stable net-
works. The dynamics clearly depends on the value of ε, but also on the specific set
C of the coalitions we consider: we are going to explore the effect of both. As case
study, we consider a simple instance of HBCG with teams defined in Section 3.2.
Let the set of nodes be N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. The nodes are divided into
three teams, T1 = {1, 2, 3}, T2 = {4, 5, 6} and T3 = {7, 8, 9}. We take α = 1.5
and β = 2. For any experiment the initial network topology is selected uniformly
at random among all the possible networks. At each iteration, p = (pS)S∈C , pI(·),
pnI(·) are uniformly distributed. The internal stability is known for this game, so,
in the dynamics we update the networks in such a way that the internal stability
of the networks is preserved.
The case of all coalitions. We start considering a very small error probability
ε = 0.00001. Figure 3 shows the time-evolution of the cost of the network selected
by the dynamics. The curve suggests that the network dynamics has selected (very
fast) a quasi-stable network of cost 145.5, that is the cost of the team-star for these
specific values of α and β. An inspection of the topologies of the networks show
that the dynamics reaches a specific team-star network and then nothing changes
until the end of the simulation. In this simulation, the probability of appearing a
specific team-star network is 0.9979. Note that we do not know if the team-star is
stable with respect to the set of all the possible coalitions, but this experiment (and
many others we carried on) suggest that this is the case, because we never observed
an improving deviation.
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Figure 3. Sample path of network dynamics for ε = 0.00001
To check the stability of a team-star network using simulation we run a long
experiment at sufficiently low ε = 0.000001 where we take the initial network a
team-star network. We do not see any improving deviation till the end of simulation
as shown by Figure 4.
Next, we consider the case of much higher error probability ε = 0.01. We can see
from Figure 5 that the evolution of network cost is now very noisy because the dy-
namics jumps to a random network on average every 100 iterations due to high error
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Figure 4. Sample path at ε = 0.000001 under team-star as initial network
probability. Even a stable network would not survive for a long time in this case.
We run 100 simulations where each simulation starts with an initial condition that
is chosen uniformly at random. Figure 6 shows the aggregate empirical distribution
of network costs. The probability of appearing team-star network in this case is
0.0303. The network dynamics visits now more often the networks which are more
costly than the team-star. We checked some of these networks which appear more
frequently and none of them was stable. In particular, for all of them, the team-star
was an improving deviation for the grand coalition. One could then wonder why
these networks appear more often than the team-star during the dynamics. The
reason behind is that such networks appear in much more “forms” than team-star.
In fact there are only 9 team-star networks (in each of them a different node is the
center of the star). For example some of the networks appearing more frequently
are team-stars with a few more links. There are many different ways to place such
extra links in order to have a network with the same cost. Said in other words,
the classes of isomorphic networks have different sizes, and frequency with which
a representant of the class appears during the network dynamics depends on its
stability versus deviations but also simply on the size of the class.
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Figure 5. Sample path of network dynamics for ε = 0.01
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Figure 6. Empirical cost distribution for ε = 0.01
To check the fraction of time spent in team-star corresponding to different er-
ror probabilities over multiple simulations, we run 100 simulations, where initial
condition is chosen uniformly at random in each simulation, for a given ε. The
summary of these results are given in Figure 7. We observe that probability of ap-
pearing team-star increases as error probability decreases. Finally, we calculate the
fraction of time team-star appeared, when edge additions or edge deletions occur
at random, from our simulations data. The summary of these results are given in
Figure 8. In this case, we observe that probability of appearing team star is almost
zero corresponding to all the error probabilities considered in the experiment.
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Figure 7. Fraction of time spent in team-star under network dynamics
Without the grand coalition. Here we consider the case where the grand coali-
tion cannot form, but only the coalitions of size up to 2 can be formed. We first
consider ε = 0.00001.
In Figure 9, we observe first an evolution similar to that in Figure 3 with the
network dynamics selecting very fast a team-star, but in this case an error after
the 70000-th iteration produces a restart. Interestingly, after the restart, the cost
reaches a constant value equal to 146.5. In this case the constant cost hides in
reality a continuously changing topology. In fact, there are multiple networks with
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Figure 9. Sample path of network dynamics for ε = 0.00001
cost 146.5 which can be obtained one from the other by improving deviations from
a coalition of size 2 and this is actually what is happening in this simulation. These
networks are not even quasi-stable according to our definition, but from the point
of view of the global cost, the situation does not change. As a final remark, we
checked that also for these networks the team-star is an improving deviation, but
it can only be enforced by the grand coalition, which is not considered in this case.
For the larger error probability ε = 0.01 the dynamics appear to be similar to the
previous case.
Only single team coalitions. Since, the creation of an external link requires a
coalition of the two teams, then, in this case the only possible change is due to team
severing links to other teams if it is beneficial for them or because of a random error.
As soon as one of the team is disconnected from the other, there will be no more
improving deviation, because the cost of each team becomes infinite. Then in this
scenario the network evolves because of the random errors until all the teams are
disconnected. This is the absorbing state for the network dynamics.
7. Conclusions. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper where the
concept of teams is introduced in network formation games. We extend the concept
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of pairwise stable networks to this new class of games, but also define the concept
of network stability toward deviations from a specific set C of teams’ coalitions. We
show that C-stable networks (and closed network cycles), having minimum stochas-
tic potential, are selected by a trembling-hand dynamics when the error probability
vanishes. Finally, we resort to simulations to study the evolution of networks in a
specific game by using our stochastic dynamics. We think that the idea of teams
in network formation games may capture many practical phenomena such as con-
nectivity pattern in the Internet Autonomous systems and it opens new research
directions.
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